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Real Assets, Liquidation Value and Choice
of Financing
Crocker H. Liu,* Peng Liu** and Zhipeng Zhang***
We use real estate firms to examine how asset liquidation values influence a
firm’s financing choice, because the productivity and quality of each asset is
observable and potential measures of an asset’s liquidation value are easier to
ascertain ex ante. We show that compared to firms that issue equity, firms that
issue debt have higher asset quality. The effect of their expected asset liqui-
dation value is significant, even after we control for other factors that influence
financing decisions. For firms whose assets’ quality is not easily observable,
we find that firms’ financing choices depend heavily on conditions in the overall
real estate market.
The financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 was arguably triggered by the collapse of
the U.S. housing bubble. In the years leading up to the outbreak of the crisis,
asset quality of subprime mortgages were assessed improperly. This led to
excessive cheap credit to financial institutions and house owners with low
credit worthiness, which subsequently exacerbated the impact of the housing
slump. Tremendous efforts have since been devoted to enhancing the stability
of financial markets. However, research on how to fairly assess asset quality
is scarce. This article seeks to fill this gap by proposing three novel firm-level
measures of asset quality. Using these measures, we directly examine how
asset quality, through its link to liquidation values, affects financing decisions
of real estate investment trusts (REITs).
Market participants have long recognized the importance of asset quality in
the price formation process in financial markets. Asset quality as defined in
our study includes tenant quality and the diversity of industries in a given
location. The latter factor is commonly known as the economic base and
it measures the firesale effect proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1992). The
actions of Bill Ackman, the CEO of hedge fund Pershing Square Capital
Management LP, represent one example of market participants’ recognition
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of the quality–price relationship. In an October 6, 2009, presentation of Re-
alty Income (ticker symbol O) entitled “‘O’ No!,” Ackman announced that
he was shorting the REIT because he believed that Realty Income Corp had
issues with tenant quality. As evidence of poor tenant quality/credit ratings,
his presentation noted that not only was there a high concentration of dis-
cretionary, regional retail tenants (such as casual dining restaurants, movie
theaters, and day care centers.) that had been hit hard in the recession, but
there were also some of the largest tenants having junk or unrated credit
ratings with high leverage (bankruptcy potential). In addition to this, the re-
port goes on to say that “unlike many other REITs, Realty Income does not
disclose its tenants.1 There is limited transparency as to: names of tenants,
credit of tenants, average credit rating of total tenant pool, and individual
tenant contribution to revenue. Analysts and investors have asked for more
tenant disclosure, but the Company has refused. Question: Why? Answer: We
believe that O’s tenant quality is poor and the company is concerned about
the impact of transparency on its stock price.” This suggests to Mr. Ackman
that the dividend will probably get cut and investors will be hurt.2
Asset quality is not only important in predicting future REIT performance but
it is also a critical factor in the asset liquidation process. The key objective of
the FDIC resolution process is to identify and implement the disposition of the
failed financial institution’s assets that is least costly to the deposit insurance
fund. According to Schiffman (2009), the FDIC recognizes asset quality as
a determinant in setting the reserve price because this is one factor used to
group assets into pools. The reserve price (minimum bid) is then assigned
based on the value of the underlying collateral of each pool to achieve the
maximum recovery in liquidation. Besides this, in an April 12, 2007, report
entitled “INDUS (ECLIPSE 2007-1) plc,” the bond rating agency DBRS3
was of the opinion that
“property quality grades of above average or excellent ... are more capable of
retaining and attracting tenants and thus more liquid in a stressed market...
The highest-quality properties within a market have lower probabilities of
default because they are more likely to be viable and attractive to new tenants,
1For comparison purposes, Ackman notes that “Simon Property Group, for example,
discloses tenants representing as little as 0.2% of its minimum rental income.”
2Once word of his presentation got out, shares were down over 7% at one point on
Wednesday.
3DBRS is a rating agency that rates companies and single-purpose vehicles that issue
commercial paper, term debt and preferred shares in the global capital markets. For
further information, please visit http://www.dbrs.com/about.
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increasing cash flow stability. To evaluate property quality, DBRS considers
the location, the functional utility of the asset ...”
The recent bankruptcy of mall operator General Growth Properties (GGP)
provides further evidence of the impact that asset quality has on the value
of real estate. Faced with dwindling options for managing its $25+ bil-
lion in short-term mortgage debt coming due within a year, GGP filed for
bankruptcy on April 16, 2009. It was the largest real estate bankruptcy since
1980. In commenting on GGP’s bankruptcy, the New York Times noted that
“Few analysts dispute the quality of General Growth’s malls, which include
the Ala Moana Center in Honolulu, Water Tower Place in Chicago and the
Grand Canal Shoppes at the Venetian in Las Vegas. But its undoing was the
mounting pile of short-term mortgages the operator used to expand.” GGP’s
high-quality assets resulting from high-quality tenants and prime locations
resulted in a bidding war between Simon Property Group and Brookfield
Asset Management with the former suitor raising its price three times in their
unsuccessful bid. Given its asset quality, GGP was able to negotiate one large
equity commitment instead of trying to sell off assets piecemeal during its
reorganization. According to Chris Macke, senior real estate strategist with
the CoStar Group, “Trying to sell the malls one by one would likely have
taken much longer than a year and might have forced the company to accept
deep discounts on its assets.” The impact that asset quality had on GGP’s re-
organization is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny’s (1992) liquidation value
theory: with good assets, not only do its competitors want their assets, but
also debt capacity is higher, which is why GGP was in trouble. Due to good
asset quality, GGP left bankruptcy on November 8, 2010, splitting itself into
two independent and publicly traded companies.4
Using prior research5 as our starting point, we examine the relation between
a firm’s financing choice and determinants of its liquidation value with an
4Its namesake, an REIT (the New GGP) comprised of 170 core regional malls and 65
additional properties (strip centers and offices that will be sold) and Howard Hughes
Corp., (NYSE:HHC), an operating company focusing on the development of master
planned communities and shopping centers.
5Our work builds on earlier research that empirically tests the effect of liquidation
value on a firm’s capital structure choices. For example, Benmelech and Bergman
(2008), who study the U.S. airline industry and Benmelech (2009), who examines the
19th century American railroad industry, find that firms with more saleable real assets
and redeployable collateral tend to have lower costs of external financing and longer
maturities associated with debt financing. Almeida and Campello (2007) gauges the
expected liquidation value of firm’s main categories of operating assets using various
measures of asset tangibility. In a dynamic model of collateralized firm financing
framework, Rampini and Viswanathan (2010) predicts that firms with low net worth
exhaust their debt capacity and hedge less.
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emphasis on asset quality. We propose three firm-level measures of asset
quality. First, motivated by the aforementioned anecdotal evidence, we focus
on tenant quality rather than the potential buyers of a firm’s assets. This
measure proxies for the sustainability of the cash flows associated with the
assets over the business cycle. Second, we look at the firesale discount of a
firm’s assets by constructing a measure of asset liquidity using information
on the local economy. More liquid assets should experience less firesale
discount in liquidation (Shleifer and Vishny 1992) and hence be of higher
quality. Finally, we utilize historical loss severity rates from similar liquidation
events.
The rationale for these measures goes to the issue of value in best use. The
value of assets is reflected by their ability to generate cash flow. In our case,
real estate properties generate cash flows through a bundle of existing and
future lease contracts. Consequently, tenant quality and the economic base
of the local real estate markets affect whether asset sales are at prices below
the value in best use. Because real estate properties are fixed in location,
the health of the local economy influences the cash flow of the tenant and
hence its decision to remain in its contract. Therefore, potential buyers face
a decision on assessing the value in best use, given the quality of the asset in
question relative to the desirability of the local region. This emphasis is the
distinguishing feature of our study. We theoretically prove and empirically
test the notion that asset quality, which we measure by tenant quality, together
with the industry concentration structure of the local real estate market, de-
termines the liquidation value of an REIT and its financing choices. Our
fundamental measures of asset liquidation value include the industry con-
centration of local markets, which more accurately captures the long-term
zoning flexibility notion of Benmelech, Garmaise and Moskowitz (2005) and
a measure of tenant quality, which reflects the short-run or intermediate-term
asset quality.
In addition to their close relation to the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009, we
choose to focus on real estate firms rather than general corporations to ana-
lyze the role of asset liquidation values in a firm’s financing decisions for the
following reasons. First, real estate firms, with their unique features, provide
an identification framework for general finance theories in the prior literature.
As Benmelech, Garmaise and Moskowitz (2005) note, the real estate market
is a natural candidate for testing financial contracting, given its high levels of
debt coupled with potential measures of an asset’s liquidation value, which is
usually difficult to ascertain ex ante. They use commercial real estate to test
Shleifer and Vishny’s (1992) hypothesis on the firesale effect. In addition,
REITs are more homogeneous and offer greater transparency (Capozza and
Seguin 1998, Chui, Titman and Wei 2003, Kallberg, Liu and Pasquariello
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2008) with respect to their operations and assets. The comparative advantage
of using REITs is that the productivity, asset quality and other asset charac-
teristics, all critical characteristics in determining an asset’s liquidation value
and optimal financing choice of a project, are observable on the asset (prop-
erty) level (Liu 2010). Moreover, real estate constitutes a nontrivial portion of
the assets held on the balance sheets of corporations. According to Chaney,
Sraer and Thesmar (2010), 58% of U.S. public firms in 1993 reported at
least some real estate ownership, with real estate accounting for 19% of these
firms’ total market value. Thus, our analysis may provide new insights on
the liquidity of assets and liquidation values for other industries with tangible
fixed assets (property, plant and equipment, PP&E).
Another distinguishing feature of our study is that we examine firms’ new
security issuances in the primary markets rather than the commonly used
leverage ratios. By focusing on a firm’s incremental financing decisions,
our approach addresses the persistence problem of leverage ratios (Lemmon,
Roberts and Zender 2008), which may yield misleading results (Strebulaev
2007).
The article is organized as follows. In the section “A Stylized Model of
Liquidation Value,” we provide a stylized model that links a firm’s liquidation
value to our three measures of asset quality. The model helps us to disentangle
the intrinsic asset characteristics from the market proxy for liquidation value,
which guides our empirical tests. In the section “Measures of Asset Quality,”
we discuss in more details our measures of asset quality: tenant quality,
firesale discount and the loss severity rate. In section “Data,” we describe
our sample, and in section “Empirical Analysis” we investigate the relation
between financing choices and asset liquidation values. Section “Conclusions”
concludes.
A Stylized Model of Liquidation Value
A real estate firm (REIT) operates a portfolio of commercial real estate assets,
which generates a constant cash flow6 of I per unit of time until default. A
default event occurs according to a Poisson process with an exogenous hazard
intensity of λ.
Federal regulations require that REITs must hold at least 75% of its assets in
real estate. Therefore, we assume that the firm’s value equals the total value
6In reality, net operating income (NOI), which is rental income net of operating
expenses, may not be a constant. In an alternative NOI specification we developed,
the major result remains the same.
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of the assets it holds. We further assume that due to private information,
geographical expertise, and reputation developed in operating the portfolio of
real assets, the current firm is the first-best owner, in the sense that the real
assets under current REIT management generate the highest cash flows until
the event of default.
In fact, the informal arguments that link the firm’s liquidation value to the best
use of assets are often maintained as the following quotation from Shleifer
and Vishny (1992) indicate:
“Because of credit constraints and government regulation of industry buyers,
assets would have to be sold to industry outsiders who don’t know how
to manage them well, face agency costs of hiring specialists to run these
assets properly. When industry buyers cannot buy the assets and industry
outsiders face significant costs of acquiring and managing the assets, assets
in liquidation fetch prices below value in best use, which is the value when
managed by specialists.”
Formally, if it defaults, the REIT liquidates its portfolio of real assets as
a whole to homogeneous second-best owners in the competitive secondary
market. Over time, the new owners gradually obtain private information,
develop expertise and rebuild the reputation by managing the assets. Hence,
over time, the cash flow reverts to the predefault level. We assume that
the cash flow generated under the management of the second-best owner is
(1 − βe−κt )I , where β ∈ (0, 1) captures the instant discount of the cash flow
at liquidation; κ measures the speed of cash flow recovery to its pre-default
level, and t is the length of time after default.
All market participants are risk-neutral and discount future cash flows by
the constant risk-free rate, r . The market value of the firm is the sum of
the present value of its cash flow until default and the present value of the
liquidation value upon default:
V0 = E0
[∫ τλ
0
e−rs I ds + e−rτλ V1
]
, (1)
where we assume the current time is zero and denote τλ as the time of
default. E0(·) is the expectation taken at time 0. V1 is the market value of the
liquidating real assets at τλ. V1 is the sum of the present value of the cash
flows under a new REIT until the next default and the present value of the
liquidation value upon the next default:
V1 = E0
[∫ τ ′λ
0
e−r t
(
1 − βe−κt)I dt + e−rτ ′λ V1
]
, (2)
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where τ ′λ denotes the time between the first and the second defaults. The
terminal value is also V1 because upon the second default, the homogeneous
and competitive second-best owners are facing exactly the same situation as
the REIT faces at the first default. Solving Equation (2), we get the firm’s
liquidation value as:
V1 = I
r
(
1 − β r + λ
r + λ + κ
)
. (3)
To make the firm’s liquidation value scalable, we normalize the terminal
liquidation value V1 by its current market value V0. From Equation (1), we
can write the current market value as
V0 = 1
r + λ (I + λV1). (4)
Therefore, the normalized liquidation value is
L ≡ V1
V0
= (r + λ)V1(I + λV1) . (5)
When we examine the determinants that affect this normalized liquidation
value, we find that the larger the normalized liquidation value, L , the more
likely the real estate firm is to finance with debt than equity ex ante, according
to Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
Measures of Asset Quality
The objective of our study is straightforward: we examine the impact of asset
liquidation value on a firm’s financing decision, which is summarized in the
following overarching hypothesis.
The Overarching Hypothesis: An increase in asset liquidation value in-
creases a firm’s debt capacity.
To empirically investigate such a linkage, it is essential to measure a firm’s
liquidation value correctly. Our model presented in the previous section im-
plies that measures of asset quality, namely tenant quality and the firesale
discount, are directly related to a firm’s liquidation value. Furthermore, prior
liquidations of similar assets also provide signals on the liquidation value
of a firm. The historical liquidation events are more important if the asset
quality and firesale discount are not measurable or are not transparent. In
the following subsections, we develop three testable hypotheses linking these
measures of asset quality to the likelihood of a debt issuance.
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Tenant Quality
Real assets with higher tenant quality generate more stable long-term cash
flows. In our model, the new, second-best owner initially incurs additional
costs to obtain private information about and to develop a relationship with
the tenants. This suboptimal level of cash flows reverts back to the predefault
first-best level over time. With high-quality tenants, the process can be con-
siderably shorter because of the stable cash flows. Therefore, tenant quality
determines the speed of cash flow recovery κ . It follows from Equations (3)
and (5) that
∂L
∂κ
= β I
2(r + λ)2
r (I + λV1)2(r + λ + κ)2
> 0. (6)
Equation (6) predicts that tenant quality has a positive effect on the normalized
liquidation value.
There are several ways to measure tenant quality with respect to cash flow
stability. Tax regulation requires that at least 95% of REIT gross income must
come from rental income or other passive investment such as Treasuries.
Property value is defined as capitalized future rents, which are contracted
in the properties’ leases. Therefore, one way to measure cash flow stability
is by its lease maturities. For example, a firm’s real assets with long-term
leases should have higher quality, because future cash flows are more stable
for the asset owner over a long time period. However, in reality, the lease
term tells only a part of the story. Because the lease maturity and rental
payment are results of negotiation between lessor and lessee, they thus reflect
a balance between the cash flow stability and option value. Therefore, the
lease expiration structure suffers from an endogeneity problem as a proxy for
liquidation value.
Liu and Liu (2013) explicitly exam the channels through which the tenant
quality impact the performance of its landlord REIT company. Similarly, we
argue that tenant credit worthiness is the main driver of asset liquidation
value. Our reasoning is that there are also costs associated with long-term
leases. When the long-term rent is higher than the market rent, the owner may
experience lease defaults. When the long-term rent is lower than the market
rent, the owner does not have the option to adjust the rent accordingly. There-
fore, short-term leases give the property owner more control over property
improvement, restructuring and refinancing flexibility. Furthermore, the lease
term and base lease are often bundled with lease escalation, percentage rent
and lease options (lease renewal, cancelation option, expansion option, etc.).
Without other contract terms such as escalation and the options mentioned
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above, the lease maturity itself cannot capture the whole value of the lease
contract.
We propose tenants’ credit quality as a new measure of tenant quality. Most
asset managers believe that the property is only as strong as the tenant (Smith
2009). Under the nondisturbance clause, the tenant will continue to occupy
the property and pay rents under the current terms even if the property is
sold or is taken over from the current landlord by the creditors. Therefore,
when the current owner liquidates its assets, the speed of cash flow recovery
κ depends on the creditworthiness of existing tenants. In other words, the
liquidation value of a landlord firm depends on the creditworthiness of its
tenants. Tenant quality was especially highlighted during the 2007 to 2009
financial crisis. In the case of lease contracts, often referred to as the engines
of property values, lease counterparty risk arises when a tenant with low
creditworthiness is unable to make rental payments. Therefore, the quality
of lease contracts depends on the credit quality of the tenants. A tenant
with better quality implies less rental payment risk, which in turn means
higher asset quality. We measure asset quality with the revenue-weighted
Altman Z score, which we construct using the historical performance of
assets, liabilities, and earnings to predict a firm’s probability of default.
To construct such a measure, we focus on the major tenants that provide the
top 60% of the landlord firm’s revenue in aggregate and match all publicly
traded tenants to Compustat. We calculate an average tenant Altman Z score
weighted by the percentage contribution of revenue of each tenant for every
firm in our sample.
Thus, our first testable implication is as follows:
Testable Implication I: An REIT with higher average tenant Z scores has
higher asset quality and higher liquidation value. Therefore, an REIT with
higher average tenant Z scores tends to finance with debt.
Firesale Discount
One key problem with illiquid assets like real estate is that a hasty liquidation
may cause significant private costs to the owner. When a financially con-
strained real estate firm wants to sell a property in a highly concentrated real
estate market, it is likely that potential buyers are in similar financial distress.
Consistent with this argument, real estate appraisers typically assume that a
rapid sale of real estate leads to a liquidation discount (or firesale discount),
because redeployment of the firm’s assets is difficult. Shleifer and Vishny
(1992) find that the liquidation discount is about 15% to 25% relative to an
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orderly sale. Kaplan (1989) cites Merrill Lynch estimates that the distressed
sale of the Campeau retail empire would bring about 68% of what an orderly
sale would bring.
In our model, we capture such a liquidation discount by β, which represents
an immediate drop in the generated cash flows at the time of liquidation.
Based on Equations (3) and (5), we get
∂L
∂β
= − I
2(r + λ)2
r (I + λV1)2(r + λ + κ)
< 0. (7)
Therefore, our model predicts a negative effect of the liquidation discount on
the normalized liquidation value.
Real estate assets are immobile and location quality is therefore an important
component of the asset quality. In our analysis, we measure the firesale
discount using an average ratio of the industry concentration of a REIT’s
top markets. Each local market is defined as a Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA). The United States Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines
an MSA as one or more adjacent counties or county equivalents that have
at least one urban core area of at least 50,000 population, plus adjacent
territory that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the
core as measured by commuting ties. The OMB has defined 366 MSAs in
the United States. For example, the New York metropolitan area (the New
York–Northern New Jersey–Long Island MSA), which is the largest MSA in
the United States, includes 10 counties in New York State, 12 counties in
Northern and Central New Jersey and 1 county in northeastern Pennsylvania.
The idea is that REITs that invest in areas with a high industry concentration
(less diversified mix of industries in a given locale) may have to offer a deeper
discount to sell their assets, because the potential buyers may be suffering the
same financial difficulty. For example, the redeployability of real estate assets
in Detroit is much lower than in other areas, as most businesses in Detroit
are associated with the auto industry.
Using commercial property zoning flexibility as a proxy for liquidation val-
ues, Benmelech, Garmaise and Moskowitz (2005) find that higher liquidation
values are associated with longer term loans, a smaller number of creditors,
higher loan-to-value ratios and lower interest rates. Although the flexibility
in zoning designation that governs permitted uses of a property, is associated
with the potential level of property redeployability, such effects tend to in-
fluence the liquidation value primarily in the long run. In fact, the flexibility
option alluded to in Benmelech, Garmaise and Moskowitz (2005) is typically
out of the money except when the age of the building is such that the building
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is in need of rehabilitation or can be torn down. Due to the long-term durabil-
ity of the real estate asset, when facing financing choices firms may be more
interested in the determinants of liquidation value at short or intermediate
horizons. In the short or intermediate term, there is a greater emphasis around
asset quality such as the quality of tenants in a space. In a long-run market
equilibrium, the zoning restriction and the local economic base should be
integrated in a region that provides a unique industry structure. Therefore,
the industry concentration structure captures the long-run attractiveness of a
market.
To construct a proxy of location quality, we first obtain the top 10 markets
for each REIT. Following Liu and Liu (2013), for each MSA we calculate a
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), HHI =
∑N
i=1 E
2
i
(∑ Ei )2 , where Ei is the number
of employees in each industry category of a particular MSA. A higher HHI
means a higher industry concentration (Hirschman 1964). Doing so makes it
possible for us to measure the extent of local real estate market diversification
and industry concentration. If the labor force is wholly concentrated in a single
industry, then the index is one. With the revenue-weighted average of the local
market HHI as a proxy for the firesale discount, we have our second testable
implication.
Testable Implication II: A higher industry concentration for an REIT’s prop-
erty market is associated with a higher firesale discount upon liquidation.
Therefore, firms with lower average industry concentration ratios are more
likely to finance with debt.
If the market is more or less efficient, some of the information about asset
quality and attractiveness of real estate markets should be priced in realized
liquidations. We also test our hypotheses by using the realized loss severity
rate on securitized commercial mortgages.
Loss Severity Rate
Does past liquidation events predict future liquidation value for similar as-
sets? If the asset quality and the firesale discount are able to capture the future
liquidation value, the information from past foreclosures should be already
captured. However for firms whose properties are occupied by short-term
transient tenants or nonpublic corporate tenants, the role of historical liquida-
tion value will be more pronounced. Assuming that the historical liquidations
are indicative of future loss severity, we compute a firm-level index using
realized loss severity rate of publicly traded commercial mortgage backed
security (CMBS) as a proxy of REITs’ asset liquidation value. The loss
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severity rate of a defaulted CMBS is defined as the present value of its life-
time losses (both interest and principal losses) as a percentage of principal
balance, measured at either the origination date or the default date.
We note that there may be some difference in liquidation values between
properties collateralized in portfolio loans compared to those securitized in
CMBS deals. However, the loss severity rates extracted in CMBS deals still
provide a useful market measure for liquidation value across property types
and over time. Thus, as a measure of loss severity, we exploit the average loss
severity by property type from foreclosed real assets in securitized CMBS
deals, provided by the U.S. structured products research of LehmanLive.7
We build a loss severity indicator for each REIT according to its real asset
exposure to test our third implication. This indicator serves as a consistency
check on our prior tests.
Testable Implication III: A lower realized CMBS loss severity rate of a REIT
indicates higher asset liquidation value. Therefore, firms with lower realized
CMBS loss severity are more likely to finance with debt ex ante.
Data
The variable of interest is the choice of incremental financing, i.e., debt or
equity. The data on REITs’ incremental financing decisions are from SNL
Real Estate, which covers all equity REITs’ public security offerings from
January 2000 through December 2009. SNL Real Estate provides detailed
information on REIT investments, firm financial characteristics, as well as
information on geographical distribution of properties and tenant exposures;
most of this information is not available on Compustat.
There are 2,150 new issues, including 921 bond issues and 1,229 equity is-
sues from 183 REITs during the 2000 to 2009 period. We derive accounting
information, such as total book assets, total debt and returns on average as-
sets, from Compustat, complemented when necessary by SNL Real Estate.
Among the three components of our liquidation value measures, two reflect
fundamental measures of asset quality: the tenant quality and location quality.
However, because some properties (e.g., hotels and apartments) do not have
corporate tenants whose stock is publicly traded, the final sample contains
7LehmanLive becomes Barclays Capital Live after the Lehman Brothers was liquidated
and acquired by Barclay Capital in 2009. We also use a similar index from Standard
and Poor’s CMBS Quarterly Insights. The results are essentially the same. We thank
John Harding for providing Standard and Poor’s CMBS quarterly data of loan defaults
and losses.
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1,043 new offerings, which consist of 484 bond issues and 559 equity issues
from 102 REITs. On average, there is one issue per firm per year. For prop-
erties that are run by an operating company,8 or are mixed use, we use the
operator’s quality to represent the tenant quality. We believe that for hotels,
apartments and other property types with transient tenants, a property man-
aged by a more efficient operator should have higher asset quality.9 In the
robustness checks, the historical loss severity rate is used, which has 1,300
observations.
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of security issuances by equity REITs
between January 2000 and December 2009. Panel A reports the number of
issuances and the number of firms that issue securities by REIT property
type. SNL Real Estate defines eight property types: retail (including shopping
centers, regional malls and other retail outlets), office, industrial, apartment,
lodging, health care, diversified, and other special property types. Because
most REITs invest in only one type of real estate, the industry often classifies
REITs by the property type on which they focus. Panel B reports the number
of issuances and the number of firms that issue securities by issuing year.
Total issuance of public offerings is clustered in offices and shopping centers.
There is also an apparent time variation in the average number of security
issues per firm. The average peaks in 2004 with 179 total issues.
Table 2 presents the distribution of new security issues by REIT property
focus (panel A) and by issuing year (panel B). REITs that choose to issue
bonds are larger in size than REITs that issue equity. This phenomenon is
consistent with the general notion that large firms are more likely to have
access to the bond markets than small firms. The apartment sector, which has
special access to the debt market through government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs), and the office and retail sectors, have the most debt offerings per
firm. The health care10 and apartment sectors, which normally do not have
long-term tenants, have the most equity offerings per firm. The sample for the
2004 to 2005 period had the highest issuing intensity in debt with three bond
offerings per firm. Over the 2006 to 2008 period, there were more equity
issues per firm (almost two issues per firm) then debt issues.
8For example, some hotel properties of Hospitality Properties Trust (HPT) are run by
Hyatt Hotel Corp., or Intercontinental Hotels Group.
9For example, branded management companies (operators) such as Marriott define
quality standards under which the hotel must operate. Quality standards include a
property improvement plan (PIP), known in finance as capital expenditures necessary
to maintain not only the value of the hotel, but also the brand reputation of the hotel
operator.
10Health care sector include senior housing and assisted-living facilities.
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The two panels in Table 3 report the summary statistics of measures of asset
liquidation value by property type (panel A) and by issuing year (panel B).
Diversified REITs have the highest concentration ratios (on average, 9.67%)
indicating that firms operating in markets in which industries are more con-
centrated such as Detroit tend to diversify their property types. The health
care sector has the lowest tenant Z score (1.3) while the retail sector has
the highest tenant Z score (5–6). The lodging sector has the highest loss
severity rate, which is consistent with the industry consensus that hotels are
the riskiest asset class due to the lack of long-term tenants (e.g., many rent
rooms for just one night). The firesale discount (measured by the average
industry concentration ratio of a REIT’s top markets) are stable over time,
because those industry structures in equilibrium tend to take effect over the
long run. The tenant quality declines over the period from 2000 to 2008, and
then increases slightly in 2009.
Empirical Analysis
Based on the model of REIT liquidation value presented in Section and
empirical specifications of liquidation measures presented in Section, we test
our three implications by using multivariate logit regressions. To demonstrate
that our measures of asset liquidation value are significant determinants of
firm’s choice of financing, we need to control for alternative explanations
developed in the literature and to control for firm characteristics. Following
is a discussion of these alternative explanations and how we control for each
of them.
Controlling for Firm Default Probability and Firm Characteristics
Under the nondisturbance clause, it seems that the existing tenants determine
the cash flow recovery ability, and thus the asset value upon liquidation.
However, the ex ante measure of tenant quality also impacts the probability
of firm defaults. Higher tenant quality not only implies higher liquidation
value, but also reduces the probability of firm default. Following Sibilkov
(2009), we include the firm rating information (Rating Dummy) to control for
firm’s default probability. In addition, fixed costs associated with a new debt
issue are lower for large firms, which makes debt financing more appealing
to them. Therefore, we control for variables such as firm size, measured as
the logarithm of a firm’s book assets. Furthermore, we also control for firm
clustering effect.
Controlling for Competing Explanations
To conduct our formal regression analysis, we control for determinants of
financing choice that are commonly used in the capital structure literature:
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the effects of the trade-off theory (leverage ratio), the pecking order theory
(profitability, growth opportunity), the market timing theory (market-to-book
ratio) and signaling (dilution). We also consider alternative measures of these
control variables for our robustness checks.
Trade-off theory
The trade-off theory, first proposed by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), hy-
pothesizes that firms weigh the benefits (e.g., tax savings) against the costs
(e.g., deadweight bankruptcy costs) of debt, i.e., firms design each incremen-
tal financing activity to adjust their overall leverage ratios toward optimal
target levels. Hence, they can gradually eliminate the deviations from the
target. A firm in need of external finance should issue equity if its leverage
ratio is above the target and issue debt if it is below. Thus, we control for the
targeting behavior of corporate financing choice by using the leverage ratio
of the firm (e.g., Flannery and Rangan 2006, Lewellen 2006).
Pecking order theory
Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory states that when facing
financing needs, firms prioritize their sources of financing. Internal funds are
used first, and when those funds are depleted, the firm issues debt. When the
debt capacity is reached, the firm issues equity.
Because profitable firms have a financial surplus, the pecking order theory
predicts an inverse relation between profitability and leverage (Titman and
Wessels 1988, Fama and French 2002). Profitable firms mainly use internal
financing when necessary; hence their use of external sources of financing is
low. The negative association between profitability and leverage that supports
the pecking order theory has been empirically documented by Myers (1984),
Baskin (1989), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Stenbacka and Tombak (2002).
To control for the inverse relation between profitability and leverage ratio, we
include a measure of profitability, the return on average assets (ROAA). We
also control for a firm’s growth, which we measure as the growth rate of funds
from operations (FFO). The FFO, a proxy for free cash flow, is a measure of
REITs’ operating performance that is calculated by adding depreciation and
amortization expenses to earnings. FFO gives us a clearer idea of an REIT’s
cash performance, which is a better measure of the REIT’s performance than
is earnings.
Market timing theory
Baker and Wurgler (2002) explore the managers’ practice of timing the equity
market, and find evidence for this policy. They demonstrate that market timing
20
implies that not only does the market-to-book ratio affect capital structure
through equity issues, but also that the negative effect is persistent and helps
to explain the cross-sectional variation in leverage. These effects cannot be
explained by capital structure theories. Using alternative measures, Elliot,
Koeter-Kant and Warr (2008) show that market timing has significant impact
on the debt–equity choice. We include the market-to-book ratio to control for
the market timing effect.
Signaling
In the pecking order model, good-quality firms use internal funds to avoid the
adverse selection problem and the loss of value. However, these firms are not
able to signal their quality by using capital structure. Another strand of capital
structure theory proposed by Ross (1977) posits that capital structure serves as
a signal of private information. Ross’s argument is that equity issuance signals
that the stock is overpriced. To avoid such a signaling effect, companies with
major financing needs tend to prefer debt.
To control for the signaling effect, we include dilution as a control variable.
We compute dilution as the total amount of new issues divided by total market
cap one quarter prior to the security offering (Asquith and Mullins, 1986).
Table 4 summarizes the predicted effects on the firm’s financing decisions.
Empirical Results
We initially use univariate analysis to investigate the effect of liquidation
value on financing choice. Table 5 summarizes the descriptive statistics of
our measures of firms’ liquidation values and the explanatory variables used
in the multivariate analysis.
The Pearson correlation matrix reported in Table 6 shows that the correlations
between these explanatory variables is moderate at best; most of the correla-
tions are low for our primary variables of interests, especially tenant quality.
For example, the correlations between tenant quality and the controls for
alternative capital structure theories (leverage, profitability, market-to-book,
dilution, FFO growth, and size) are within ±0.08.The evidence supports our
claim that tenant quality is a better proxy for liquidation value. The correla-
tion between MSA industry concentration and tenant quality is −0.08, which
supports our empirical method of jointly testing short- and long-run measures
of asset liquidation value. The correlation between tenant quality and the
loss severity rate is −0.13, respectively. This result is not surprising, because
21
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Table 5  Descriptive statistics.
Variable Observation Mean SD Min Max
Tenant Quality (Z score) 1,043 3.87 2.12 −3.87 16.81
Firesale Discount (%) 1,043 8.86 0.69 7.96 11.81
Lease Maturity (years) 1,043 3.88 1.69 0.00 5.56
Loss Severity (%) 1,043 30.99 9.48 0.00 64.53
Leverage Ratio 1,043 0.48 0.13 0.09 0.97
Profitability (%) 1,043 3.50 4.36 −8.11 76.57
Market-to-book 1,043 1.14 0.24 0.56 1.78
Dilution 1,043 0.10 0.16 0.00 3.09
FFO Growth (%) 1,043 9.87 32.98 −96.57 185.92
Earning Volatility (%) 1,043 0.30 0.18 0.01 10.09
Size 1,043 14.91 1.14 9.55 17.20
This table reports the summary statistics of the independent variables of REIT security
issuance decisions for the sample of 1,043 observations.
the capital market captures some of information conveyed from fundamental
measures of asset quality.
In Table 7, we compare the distributions of asset liquidation value measures
and other explanatory variables and test for significant differences between
debt offerings and equity offerings. The results suggest that on average,
relative to REITs that issue equity, REITs that raise funds by issuing bonds
have a larger market capitalization, lower current market leverage ratios, lower
FFO growth, smaller offering amounts relative to the value of book assets
and higher market-to-book ratios.
Multivariate logit analysis
We use multivariate logit regression analysis as our primary tool to study
the choice of new security issuance. We set the dependent variable equal to
one for bond issues and zero for equity issues. We measure the liquidation
value with three different variables: the average tenant Z scores, the indus-
try concentration of top markets in which the REIT operates, and the firm’s
loss severity from historical CMBS liquidation. According to our theoreti-
cal model, we expect a positive loading on the tenant quality and negative
loadings on the firesale discount and loss-severity rates.
Our control variables include the current market leverage ratio (Leverage),
the return on average assets (Profitability), the market-to-book ratio, the of-
fering amount divided by the market cap (Dilution), the growth rate of FFOs
(FFO growth), standard deviation of Earning volatility, Rating Dummy and
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Table 7  Difference in means.
Debt Offerings Equity Offerings
Mean SE Mean SE t Stat
Measures of Liquidation Value
Tenant Quality 4.01 2.01 3.75 2.20 1.92*
Firesale Discount 8.68 0.60 9.02 0.72 −8.31***
Loss Severity 30.46 9.56 31.45 9.40 −1.70*
Control Variables
Lease Maturity 3.90 1.61 3.86 1.76 0.47
Leverage 0.47 0.11 0.50 0.15 −4.09***
Profitability 3.30 2.90 3.67 5.31 −1.39
Market-to-Book 1.16 0.24 1.13 0.23 1.83*
Dilution 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.20 −3.78***
FFO Growth 5.11 31.21 13.99 33.92 −4.37***
Earning Volatility 0.31 0.18 0.29 0.17 1.23
Size 15.43 0.99 14.46 1.08 15.10***
This table presents the sample means and sample standard errors of the dependent
and independent variables in our regression analysis of REITs’ new debt and equity
offerings. Our sample comprises 1,043 observations over the period January 2000 to
December 2009. We report t statistics and their significance levels on difference in
means. *, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
logarithm of firm’s book asset (Firm size). Our empirical evidence, which is
consistent across all three measures of liquidation value, supports the Shleifer
and Vishny (1992) hypothesis. Firms that issue bonds not only have higher
quality tenants (Z scores) but also hold assets in real estate markets that tend
to have a more diverse mix of industries in a location relative to the industry
concentration associated with equity-offering firms. The relation is reversed
for the historical loss severity. These results suggest that higher expected liq-
uidation values are associated with a higher likelihood of bond issues relative
to equity issues. The effect is significant from both statistical and economic
perspectives. A one-standard-deviation increase in the tenant quality is asso-
ciated with a 4% to 5% higher probability of issuing debt. The probability
increases by 4% for a one-standard-deviation decreases in the loss severity
rate.
Table 8 presents the multivariate logit regression results with fundamental
measures of asset liquidation value. Model 1 tests the effects of asset liquida-
tion value using the weighted average tenant Z score and the firesale discount
(measured as the MSA industry concentration ratio). Model 1 controls for
firm size and the firm ratings, but does not control for other capital structure
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Table 8  Logit regression with asset quality as firm’s liquidation value.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Change Change Change
Coefficient in Prob. Coefficient in Prob. Coefficient in Prob.
Tenant Quality 0.074*** 3.9% 0.071** 3.7% 0.092*** 4.9%
2.226 2.086 2.636
Firesale Discount −0.560*** −9.1% −0.606*** −9.8% −0.512*** −7.9%
−4.491 −4.497 −3.599
Lease Maturity 0.043 0.030
0.926 0.567
Leverage −3.514*** − 10.6%
−4.050
Profitability −0.036
−1.403
Market-to-Book −0.167
−0.398
Dilution 1.129** 4.6%
2.240
FFO Growth −0.005* −3.6%
−1.687
Earning Volatility 4.152
0.083
Rating 1.771*** 1.783*** 1.537***
8.103 8.125 6.642
Size 0.479*** 13.6% 0.463*** 13.2% 0.622*** 18.0%
5.004 4.751 5.701
Intercept −4.001** −3.512* −4.667**
−1.956 −1.661 −2.085
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.214 0.215 0.231
Observations 1,043 1,043 1,043
This table presents the multivariate logit regression results we obtain for REITs’
incremental financing decisions using a sample of 1,043 observations. The dependent
variable is set to one for a new bond issue, and zero for an equity issue. We measure
liquidation value by the revenue-weighted average Altman Z score of major tenants
and the industry concentration ratio of REIT top markets. Leverage is the ratio of total
debt to total market assets, where we define market assets as the total book assets plus
the difference between the market value of equity and the book value of equity. The
growth rate of funds from operations (FFO Growth) is the annual percentage change
in such funds. Dilution is the total amount of offering divided by the market cap prior
to the new issue. We measure profitability by the return on average assets (ROAA).
Market-to-book is the total book assets divided by the total market value of assets.
Earning Volatility is the standard deviation of FFO over the past three years. Rating
is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has either a bond rating or a
commercial paper rating and zero otherwise. Z statistics are shown in the line below
the coefficient. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively. For any independent variable that is statistically significant at 10%
and above, we provide economic significance with Change in Probability showing the
change in probability of issuing debt when the independent variable changes one
standard deviation.
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theories. The higher the asset liquidation value (lower industry concentration
and higher tenant quality), the greater the likelihood of debt issuance. The
results are statistically significant at the 1% level.
The column “Change in Prob” in Model 1, which computes the change in
probability of issuing debt for a one-standard-deviation increase in a cor-
responding variable, also shows the economic significance. A one-standard-
deviation increase (decrease) in the tenant average Z score (industry concen-
tration ratio of REIT’s top markets) is associated with a 4% (9%) higher
probability that a firm will issue debt. In addition, the firm’s characteristics
also play an important role in its financing decisions. Larger firms are more
likely to issue debt.
In Model 2 we include the average lease maturity as an additional control.
Given tenant quality, the lease maturity has no effect on a firm’s financing
choice, which verifies our hypothesis that the lease maturity is endogenously
determined.
Model 3 further controls for alternative capital structure theories. Our results
are consistent with the trade-off, pecking order and signaling theories of
capital structure. The market leverage prior to a new security issue has a
significant negative impact on the use of bonds. This finding is consistent
with the trade-off theory. Our estimates suggest that given a one-standard-
deviation increase in market leverage, on average a firm is 10.6% less likely
to issue bonds. Consistent with the pecking order theory, there is a negative
relation between debt financing and the FFO growth or profitability ratio. Our
estimates are also consistent with the signaling hypothesis, under which the
firm’s likelihood of issuing debt increases by 4.6% if the dilution measure
increases by one standard deviation. Conditional on other theories developed
in the past studies, our proxies for asset liquidation value remain significant
on both a statistical and economical basis.
Robustness checks
Table 8 establishes the major results of this study: a higher tenant quality
(tenant Z score) is associated with a higher likelihood that a firm will is-
sue debt (testable implication I); lower industrial concentration of an REIT’s
property markets indicates a lower firesale discount and a higher debt capacity
(testable implication II). We perform several robustness checks. Most impor-
tantly, we test if the historical loss severity rate from CMBS foreclosures
predicts a firm’s debt issuance decision. Using the loss severity rate as an
explanatory variable, Table 9, Model 4 (1300 observations) shows the impact
of loss severity on financing choice with respect to liquidation value. Given
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Table 9  Robustness Check—regression results with historical loss severity rates as
firm’s liquidation value.
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Change Change Change
Coefficient in Prob. Coefficient in Prob. Coefficient in Prob.
Loss Severity −0.017*** −3.9% −0.069*** −12.0% −0.005
−2.713 −4.910 −0.657
Tenant Quality 0.087*** 4.4%
2.493
Firesale Discount −0.531*** −8.1%
−3.665
Leverage −2.389*** −7.2% −1.848 −4.9% −3.577*** −10.1%
−3.471 −1.587 −4.199
Profitability −0.051** −5.3% −0.053 −0.039
−2.032 −1.118 −1.629
Market-to-Book −0.023 0.590 −0.158
−0.069 0.947 −0.377
Dilution 1.142** 4.5% 1.935*** 7.0% 1.076** 4.2%
2.430 2.770 2.094
FFO Growth −0.005** −3.9% 0.005 −0.004
−1.964 1.216 −1.520
Earning Volatility 20.99 232.00*** 9.4% 24.86
1.469 4.037 1.325
Rating 1.678*** 2.797*** 1.551***
8.148 4.967 6.629
Size 0.665*** 18.8% 0.713*** 19.3% 0.611*** 17.2%
7.848 3.291 5.569
Intercept −9.695*** −11.80*** −4.254*
−7.504 −3.833 −1.890
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.219 0.343 0.233
Observations 1,300 257 1,043
This table presents the multivariate logit regression results of REITs’ incremental financing decisions.
Model 4 uses 1,300 observations with the firm-level loss severity rate we construct using historical loss
severity rates across different property types. Model 5 tests the role of firm-level loss severity index in
REITs’ financing choice for a sample of firms that do not have tenant information (363 observations).
Model 6 jointly tests the role of loss severity in addition to tenant quality and firesale discount in
explaining REITs’ financing choice (1,043 observations). It shows that when asset quality and firesale
discount are in place, the explanatory power of historical loss severity is significantly reduced. The
dependent variable is set to one for a new bond issue, and zero for an equity issue. Leverage is the
ratio of total debt to total market assets, where we define market assets as the total book assets plus
the difference between the market value of equity and the book value of equity. Funds from operations
(FFO) growth is the annual percentage change in such funds. Dilution is the total amount of offering
divided by the market cap prior to the new issue. We measure profitability by the return on average
assets (ROAA). Market-to-book is the total book assets divided by the total market value of assets.
Earning Volatility is the standard deviation of FFO over the past three years. Rating is a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has either a bond rating or a commercial paper rating
and zero otherwise. Z statistics are shown in the line below the coefficient. *, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. For any independent variable that is
statistically significant at 10 showing the change in probability of issuing debt when the independent
variable changes one standard deviation.
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proxies for trade-off, pecking order, market timing and signaling theory, the
firm’s historical loss severity is significantly associated with the firm’s deci-
sion to issue debt. A one-standard-deviation increase in the loss severity rate
is associated with a 4% decrease in the probability of issuing debt.
Model 5 in Table 9 tests the same prediction using a subsample of 257
observations, which do not contain either local market information or tenant
information. For the most part, the sample used in Model 4 contains properties
such as hotels, apartments, health care facilities and other type of firms whose
tenant information is not disclosed. Model 4 shows that the impact of the loss
severity rate to a firm’s likelihood of issuing debt is three times that in the
overall sample with 1,300 observations. A one-standard-deviation increase
in loss severity is associated with a 12% decrease in the likelihood of debt
issuance.
To see if the historical loss severity provides any additional information
beyond the tenant quality and the firesale discount, we include all three
determinants (tenant Z score, MSA industrial concentration ratio and loss
severity index) in Model 6. The tenant quality and the firesale discount remain
significant drivers of a firm’s financing choice in this model. Other control
variables have similar results. However, the historical loss severity measure
no longer has a significant association with firm debt issuance, which is
consistent with our model.
Conclusions
We propose three novel measures of asset quality and utilize them to investi-
gate the influence of asset liquidation value on firms’ financing decisions. The
real estate industry provides an ideal setting to test the cross-sectional patterns
of firms’ financing choices, because the values of real assets are relatively
easier to identify and measure. Our measures of asset quality encompass not
only the credit quality of the tenants who occupy the building, but also the
location quality of an area. To determine location quality, we use the eco-
nomic base (mixture of various industries) of an area as a proxy, because real
estate is fixed in location and the health of the local economy influences the
cash flow of the tenants. The location quality measures the firesale effect. Our
tenant quality measure reflects the asset quality from a shorter-term perspec-
tive. Because our metric of industry concentration (economic base) within
local markets captures the long-term redeployability notion of Benmelech,
Garmaise and Moskowitz (2005), we essentially control for such long-term
equilibrium vis-a`-vis the industry concentration.
We construct a stylized valuation model to link asset quality to liquidation
value. We then test whether our model predicts the observed choices that firms
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make in terms of their choice to issue debt or equity. We show that REITs
with higher asset values (as proxied by tenant quality, etc.) also tend to be
REITs that borrow more debt, but this is a statistical association potentially
driven by omitted factors, not a causal relationship. Asset quality, through its
link to liquidation value, significantly affects the choice of financing.11 Firms
that issue debt not only have higher quality tenants, but also hold assets in
geographical markets that have a more diverse mix of industries relative to
firms that issue equity. For firms such as hotels, apartments and self-storage,
whose assets are not occupied by long-term tenants we cannot easily observe
the fundamental measures of asset quality. The firm’s financing choices rely
more heavily on the overall real asset market conditions in these situations.
We thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful suggestions which have signifi-
cantly improved the quality of our article. We also wish to thank the co-editor
Walter Torous for his comments as well.
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